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Patty Bishop, individually and
as personal representative of
the Estate of Douglas J. Bishop,deceased,
Bart J. Bishop, Douglas Wade Bishop,
Bradley David Bishop, and Joshua Lee Bishop,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
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GenTec inc..
a Kentucky corporation,
and John Does l-V,
Defendants, Third-Party Plaintiff,
Appellee, and Cross-Appellant.
Valley Asphalt, Inc.,
a Utah corporation,
Third-Party Defendant
and Appellant.
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Fourth District. Utah County
The Honorable Ray Harding, Jr.
Attorneys:
Allen K. Young, Springville, for plaintiffs
Paul M. Belnap. Andrew D. Wright, Darren K. Nelson. Salt Lake City, for GenTec
Robert G. Gilchrist, Mark L. McCarty, Brandon B. Hobbs, Lynn S. Davies, Salt Lake City, for Valley Asphalt
DURHAM, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
V This appeal and cross-appeal challenge the judgment entered in a wrongful death action brought by Patty
Bishop individually and as the executor of the decedent Douglas Bishop's estate and Bishop's children. Bishop, an
employee of Valley Asphalt, Inc., died as a result of personal injuries sustained while performing repair work on
asphalt silo components manufactured by GenTec, Inc., and installed and maintained by Valley Asphalt. Bishop
sued GenTec for products liability, and GenTec filed a third-party complaint against Valley Asphalt, seeking
indemnification for GenTec's negligence, strict liability, and products liability based on the language in an invoice
signed by Valley Asphalt. With respect to the indemnification, the court granted GenTec's motion for summary
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judgment. The jury allocated fault to both GenTec and Valley Asphalt Judgment was then apportioned pursuant to
Utah s Liability Reform Act. Bishop moved to amend thejury verdict based on clerical error but the trial court
denied the motion Valley Asphalt and Bishop appealed, and GenTec filed a cross-appeal.
BACKGROUND
112 In late 1994 orearly 1995, Valley Asphalt, planning to expand its asphalt storage capacity contacted GenTec
a manufacturer and assembler of hot asphalt silos and silo components, to purchase hot asphalt silo components
Valley Asphalt purchased components for an asphalt silo from GenTec on August 7, 1995, and signed GenTec's
standard invoice entitled "Equipment Sales Order and Security Agreement." On the reverse side of the pre-printed
invoice were two sections entitled "INDEMNIFICATION" and "INSTALLATION," which purported to place
limitations on GenTec's liability. Soon after completion of the purchase, Valley Asphalt received the silo
components and constructed the system pursuant to the specifications provided by GenTec.
113 On July 12, 1997, while inspecting and attempting to repair one of Valley Asphalt's asphalt silos Bishop was
caught between the doors of the silo when they suddenly closed and was crushed. He died later that day as a
result of his injuries. The components that crushed Bishop were those purchased under the August 7 1995
invoice. Subsequently, Bishop's executor filed this wrongful death action against GenTec.
K4 GenTec filed a third-party complaint against Valley Asphalt, seeking apportionment of fault and indemnification
under the pre-printed terms on the reverse side of the August 7, 1995 invoice. After review of GenTec's and Valley
Asphalt's cross-motions for summary judgment on the indemnification question, the trial court found that the two
entities were sophisticated business entities, that they negotiated the terms ofthe invoice at arm's length and that
the language in the invoice evidenced the intent of the parties to reallocate all liability to Valley Asphalt, including
claims against GenTec for negligence, strict liability, and products liability.
1f5 The jury apportioned fault according to a special verdict form, allocating 25 percent of the fault to Bishop 45
percent to GenTec, and 30 percent to Valley Asphalt. In addition to apportioning fault, the jury determined the
amount of general damages to be $750,000 and special damages to be $800,000. Because Valley Asphalt was a
party immune from suit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(3)(a) (Supp. 2001), the trial judge reapportioned
Valley Asphalt's 30 percent fault according to Utah's Liability Reform Act ("LRA"). Utah Code Ann §§ 78-27-37 to
-43 (1999), which resulted in allocating 64.29 percent of the total fault to GenTec and 35.71 percent to Bishop The
trial court then reduced the jury's damages award by the 35.71 percentage offault allocated to Bishop. Both
GenTec and Valley Asphalt objected to the reapportionment. They claimed that either Valley Asphalt's liability
should be combined with Bishop's liability under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior or if respondeat
superior did not apply, that the reapportionment part of the LRA, section 78-27-39(2)(a), is unconstitutional under
both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Uniform
Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution, art. I, section 24. The trial court overruled GenTec's and Valley
Asphalt's constitutional objections. With respect to the respondeat superior argument, the trial court found that the
LRA superceded the common law and that "the statute clearly and unambiguously requires that [the] Court must
consider the fault of Mr. Bishop and Valley [Asphalt] separately."
ITS After the trial ended and the jury was excused, Bishop's counsel talked to at least three of the jurors including
the jury foreman, all of whom subsequently signed affidavits indicating they had made a mistake in their calculation
of the jury award. In their affidavits, the jurors testified that they had mistakenly subtracted 25 percent (Bishop's
proportion of fault as determined by the jury) from the general and special damages, not realizing that the
subtraction for Bishop's fault was the duty of the trial court, not the jury. Relying on these affidavits Bishop moved
to amend the jury verdict pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 59, or 60(a) or 60(b); later, however, in a hearing on the
matter. Bishop modified his motion from a request for impeachment or amendment of the verdict under rule 59 or
rule 60 to one solely for a correction of clerical error under rule 60. Bishop conceded that the juror affidavits would
not support a rule 59 motion to impeach the jury verdict.
f]7 Bishop argued, with the support of the juror affidavits, that the jury's allocation error reduced the final general
and special damages award announced in the jury verdict to a sum that was 25 percent lower than the amount thejury intended to award. Bishop maintained that the jury's intent was further evidenced by the fact that its special
damages award was almost exactly 75 percent of the $1,067,000 special damages amount presented by Bishop's
expert witness to the jury at trial. The trial court concluded that Bishop's motion to amend the jury verdict was in
reality a motion to impeach the verdict and ruled that the affidavits were not admissible pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
59(a)(2). In its order, however, the trial court did not specifically address Bishop's rule 60 motion to amend.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
<[8 The application of the LRA in apportioning fault is a legal question of statutory construction which we review for
correctness. Field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 952 P.2d 1078, 1079 (Utah 1998). Adistrict court's disposition of a summary
judgment motion is a question of taw that we review for correctness. Shurtz v. BMW of North America Inc 814
6'13/2002 8:26 AM
':nn Mi'-.hop v. (icn'Iee Inc. http: aHir(link.utcounvL:o\ opinions supopin/bishop.hun
3 of'S
P.2d 11081111-12 (Utah 1991). "We accord a trial court's interpretation of a contract no deference and review it
or correctness Aquaqen Int Inc v Calrae Trust. 972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998). Mixed questions of law and
OA7 P9H o\7eool°nfhUfo?!wSC;retl0o 'n aPplyin9 the l3W t0 the f3CtS- Woodhaven Anartments v W^shinntnn942 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1997) (citing State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)). '
ANALYSIS
I. LIABILITY REFORM ACT
1J9 GenTec and Valley Asphalt argue that the trial court should have combined Bishop's neoligence with that of his
employer Va^ey Asphalt, under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Alternatively, GenTecfand Valley Asphalt also
tq9^ noV? doctnne °l respondeat superior does not apply, the reapportionment provision of the LRA, section
78-27-39(2)(a), is unconstitutional under the Uniform Operation of Laws clause of the Utah Constitution Utah
Const, art. Isection 24, and the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution US Const amend XIV
section 1. The first question before us therefore concerns the interaction between the LRA and the common'law
doctrine of respondeat superior.^ Utah has adopted the common law, except for instances where the common
law is contrary to orconflicts with the United States Constitution, the Utah Constitution a statute or Utah public
policy. See Utah Code Ann, § 68-3-1 (2001), In determining whether a statestatute pre-empts the common law
we have used the federal model for determining whether federal law pre-empts state law See Gilger v
Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, H11, 997 P.2d 305. The United States Supreme Court has stated,
[i] Sometimes courts, when facing the pre-emption question, find language in the , statute that
reveals an explicit [legislative] intent to pre-empt [common] law. [ii] More often, explicit pre-emption
language does not appear, or does not directly answer the question. In that event, courts must
consider whether the . . . statute's "structure and purpose," ornonspecific statutory language,
nonetheless reveal a clear, but implicit, pre-emptive intent.
[a] A. . . statute, for example, may create a scheme of [statutory] regulation "so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that [the legislature] left no room for the
[common law] to supplement it."
[b] Alternatively, [statutory] law may be in "irreconcilable conflict" with [the common]
law, Compliance with both . . ., for example, may be a "physical impossibility," or,
[c] the [common] law may "stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of [the legislature]."
Id. (citing Barnett Bank ofMarion County v. Nelson. 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (citations omitted)).
1J10 The Utah Legislature did not explicitly pre-empt the common law doctrine of respondeat superior when it
passed the LRA. Therefore, we look to the statute's structure and purpose to determine whether it reflects an
implied legislative intent to do so. We conclude that the state statute and the common law principle are in conflict
and that the common law must necessarily give way to the statute. Compliance with both is impossible
Additionally, the "[common] law . . . 'stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of [the legislature].'" |q\
1J11 Application of the common law doctrine of respondeat superior to determine fault allocation in this case would
undermine the legislature's objectives in enacting the LRA. Under the plain language of the statute the only time
the principle of respondeat superior could theoretically apply is in the initial apportionment of fault under section
78-27-39(1), in cases where the person seeking recovery is not an employee. As reallocation under the statute
occurs only when the plaintiff is an employee of an immune employer, the principle of respondeat superior cannot
operate to combine the employee's and theemployer's fault in the initial allocation pursuant to section 78-27-39(1)
or in the reallocation under section 78-27-39(2)(a). If it did, the effects of section 78-27-38(2) permitting recovery
for an injured plaintiff from any defendant "whose fault, combined with the fault of persons immune from suit
exceeds the fault of the [plaintiff]," Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38(2)(2001), would be completely nullified. The '
combined fault of a defendant and an immune employer would always be greater than that of the
plaintiff/employee if the plaintiff/employee's fault were to be attributed to the employer; the combined fault would
by definition, be 100 percent. The LRA must pre-empt the common law; otherwise sections 78-27-38(2) and
78-27-39(2)(a) would be without meaning or function.
1J12 More explicitly, we believe that the history of the allocation and reallocation provisions of the LRA reveals a
legislative intent to override the operation of respondeat superior in this situation. Recent amendments to the LRA
were undertaken by the legislature in specific response to Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah. 853 P 2d 877(Utah 1993). One of the issues addressed in Su_INvan was whether a jury could apportion fault to an injured
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employee s employer where the employer was a party immune from suit. Upon a plain reading of the statute and a
review of the legislative history, we determined that the LRA required apportionment both to immune parties and to
defendants in order to prevent a defendant [from being] held liable for damages in excess of its proportion of fault-
in violation of the statutory language. |d_ at 879, The dissent in Sullivan pointed out that the result would seriously
curtail employee recovery kL at886 (Stewart, J„ dissenting), but the majority felt obliged to follow the statutory
•anguage. |ri_ at 881, The legislature took notice of the case, and, in 1994 after vigorous debate amended the LRA
to provide for reallocation of fault in cases where the fault of all parties immune from suit is less'than 40 percent
Section 78-27-38 was amended by adding the language "under Section 78-27-39" to read. "No defendant is liable
.o any person seeking recovery for an amount in excess of the proportion offault attributed to that defendant
uncer Section 78-27-39." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38(3) (2001). The legislature thus balanced the factors for and
against reallocation of fault and found that reallocation between the plaintiff and the defendant was a better policy
than ,orcmg the plaintiff to bear the full burden of the immune party's fault. "Thus, in some instances the [revised]
statutory scheme itself holds defendants liable for some percentage of fault initially attributable to a person
immune from suit." Field v. Bover Co.. L.C.. 952 P,2d 1078, 1081-82 (Utah 1998).
HI 3 Valley Asphalt's and GenTec's reliance on respondeat superior is in effect a challenge to the operation of the
reapportionment provisions ofthe LRA, section 78-27-39(2)(a). Their position, if accepted would recreate the
Sijlhyan dilemma. Through the doctrine of respondeat superior, Valley Asphalt and GenTec seek to reject the
legislature's explicit resolution of that dilemma. GenTec's and Valley Asphalt's contention that fault should not be
reallocated to a defendant in excess of the liability originally attributed to that defendant is therefore unavailing in
light of the legislature's 1994 amendment to the LRA.(2] The trial court correctly determined that the LRA
pre-empted the common law.
j[14 GenTec and Valley Asphalt also argue that the reallocation provision of the LRA should be declared
unconstitutional under the Uniform Operation of Laws provision of the Utah Constitution art I section 24 and
federal equal protection jurisprudence. Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[a]ll law's of a
general nature shall have uniform operation." "In scrutinizing a legislative measure under article I § 24 we must
cetermine whether the classification is reasonable, whether the objectives ofthe legislative action are legitimate
and whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the legislative purposes " Blue Cross
&Blue Shield of Utah v. State. 779 P.2d 634. 637 (Utah 1989). ' '
1J15 GenTec and Valley Asphalt argue that the failure to include an injured employee's fault with that of his or her
employer under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior creates an unconstitutional classification They
assert that this classification unduly burdens non-immune defendants because they may become liable for fault in
excess of the fault initially attributed to them, at least where the immune party's fault is less than 40 percent.
H16 As explained above, the legislature never intended the fault initially attributed to the injured employee to be
combined, pursuant to respondeat superior, with the fault of the employer in the reallocation. The legislature
recognized the injustice ofa specific classification where an injured employee or a partially at-fault defendant third
party would have to bearor share the burden of an immune employer's fault. The classification they settled on
responds in a rational way to the conflict between protection of the interests ofplaintiff-employees and of
defendants. The amended statute strives to balance and protect the interests of both. Where the immune
employer's fault is greater than 40 percent, the injured plaintiff-employee bears the burden of the employer's fault
but where the employer's fault is less than 40 percent, the injured plaintiff-employee proportionately shares the
burden of the employer's fault with non-immune defendants. The 40 percent fault threshold is a reasonable cut-off
point; the statutory scheme legitimately strives to balance and protect both defendants and injured employees
The classification therefore serves a legitimate legislative purpose: to balance economic burdens between an
injured employee and a defendant where an immune employer is also at fault.
U17 Likewise, we conclude that the economic classification undertaken by the legislature here easily meets the
"rational basis" standard required by the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution; the legislature's
classification, as discussed above, was entirely reasonable and legitimate. Therefore, neither the Uniform
Operation of Laws provision nor the Equal Protection Clause requires us to invalidate the LRA with respect to
reallocation; the legislature's policy choice to reallocate the burden of an immune party's fault proportionally in
some circumstances between defendants and plaintiffs is constitutional.
I!. CONTRACT PROVISIONS
1)18 Valley Asphalt argues that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment with respect to certain
indemnification provisions found on the reverse side of the GenTec invoice for the equipment involved in Bishop's
accident, We have previously stated that "[on] grounds of public policy, parties to a contract may not generally
exempt a seller of a product from strict tort liability for physical harm toa user or consumer unless the exemption
term 'is fairly bargained for and is consistent with the policy underlying that [strict tort] liability '" Interwest Constr v
Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195(3) (1981))
Comment (c) to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 195, indicates that agreements exempting a seller
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from strict products liability are unenforceable.£3J
H19 In the context of negligence, we have consistently held that an "indemnity agreement which purports to make
dSr?ieS,P7°nHnn e negligence of another should be strictly construed." Freund v. Utah Power &Iinht Co 793
P.2d 3b2. 370 (1990). In construing such agreements, we have looked at the "objectives of the parties and the
surrounding facts and circumstances" in interpreting the contractual language, id, "In oeneral the common law
disfavors agreements that indemnify parties against their own negligence because 'one might be careless of
another's life and limb, if there is no penalty for carelessness.'" Hawkins v Peart 2001 UT 94 U14 37 p 3d 1062(citing Hyde v. Chevron U.S.A., 697 F.2d 614, 632 (5th Cir. 1983)). Parties seeking to exempt themselves from tort
nSlT?,,?, ya.nd ^equivocally' express an intent to limit tort liability" within the contract. See Interwest923 P.2d at 1356 (quoting DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1983)) "Without suc~h~an "
expression of intent, 'the presumption is against any such intention, and it is not achieved by inference or
implication from general language . . . .'" JU (citation omitted), Furthermore, we will not infer an intention to
indemnify against other kinds of liability, including strict liability, where such intention is not clearly expressed.
1J20 The two pertinent paragraphs found on the reverse side of the GenTec invoice read as follows:
INDEMNIFICATION
Customer shall indemnify and hold GenTec harmless from all expenses (including
attorney's fees), claims, demands, suits, judgments, actions, costs, and liabilities
(including without limitation those alleging GenTec's own negligence) which arise from
relate to or are connected with the Customer's negligent possession, use, operation or
resale of the equipment and other goods described herein or any manuals,
instructions, drawings or specifications related thereto.
(Emphasis added.)
INSTALLATION
Customer shall be solely responsible at its cost for the installation and erection of the
equipment and othergoods purchased. Although GenTec may in some cases provide
a serviceman, data, manuals, instructions, drawings or specifications to aid Customer
with installation or start-up.[sic] GenTec assumes no responsibility for proper
installation or support of the equipment or other goods when erected and disclaims any
express or implied warranties with respect to such installation or support. Whether or
not data manuals, instructions, drawings or specifications are provided or a serviceman
aids in the installation, Customer shall indemnify and hold GenTec harmless from all
expenses (including attorney's fees), claims, demands, suits, judgments, actions.
costs, and liabilities (including without limitation those alleging GenTec's own
negligence) which may arise from, relate to. or be connected with damage or personal
injury arising out of the installation, erection, start-up. or use of the equipment and
other goods purchased (including any manuals, instructions, or drawings related
thereto).
(Emphasis added.)
U21 The plain reading of the paragraph entitled "INDEMNIFICATION" restricts Valley Asphalt's agreement to
indemnify to those situations where Valley Asphalt itself is negligent. Thus, where Valley Asphalt is not negligent
Valley Asphalt has no duty to indemnify GenTec at all. Furthermore, there is no reference in the indemnification '
language to products liability. GenTec included a parenthetical clause to indicate that "liabilities" specifically
included GenTec's own negligence, but we will not read that reference to include products liability, in view ofthe
principles of strict construction to which we adhere in this area.
If22 Analysis of the paragraph entitled "INSTALLATION" results in a similar conclusion. In the relevant portion of
the "INSTALLATION" paragraph, GenTec purports to disclaim any liability for damage or personal injury "arising
out of the installation, erection, start-up, or use of the equipment." That language must be read in accordance with
the paragraph as a whole, which notes that Valley Asphalt is solely responsible for installation. Thus whereas the
INDEMNIFICATION paragraph purports to protect GenTec generally from any liability for negligence when injuries
"arise from [Valley Asphalt's] negligent possession, use. operation or resale" of equipment, the INSTALLATION
paragraph specifically protects GenTec for injuries arising outof"the installation, erection, start-up, or use"
thereof. By definition, injuries arising from Valley Asphalt's installation could not be attributed to the condition of the
product when sold (products liability), and therefore the INSTALLATION paragraph cannot be read to provide
indemnification for products liability. Thus, GenTec is not entitled to indemnification for Bishop's products liability
claim.
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T23 GenTec has also argued on appeal that the plaintiffs cause of action against it was tried to the jury as both a
products liability claim and a negligence claim, and that it is therefore entitled to the protections in the
INDEMNIFICATION paragraph for negligence. We disagree. Bishop's complaint against GenTec contains only
one cause of action, for "Products Liability (Strict Liability in Tort)." The complaint alleges a defective and
dangerous product, and asserts that the product was defectively designed and manufactured. It also alleges as
part ofthe defective design theory, that GenTec "so negligently, carelessly and recklessly designed,
manufactured, . . . sold. . . . serviced and failed to warn relative to said silo system ... so as to directly and legally
cause the accident, injuries and damages to plaintiff as described herein, ... as a result of the unreasonably
dangerous defects in the silo system design, the plaintiffs' husband and father, Douglas J. Bishop, was fatally
injured."
1124 In several memoranda to the trial court, and now on appeal, GenTec cites the foregoing language as
evicencing a theory of recovery for ordinary negligence, which it argues should bring Bishop's claim within the
negligence language of the INDEMNIFICATION & INSTALLMENT provisions of the contract. GenTec has
misapprehended the applicable principles of products liability law.
1J25 Products liability always requires proof ofa defective product, which can include "manufacturing flaws, design
defects, and inadequate warnings regarding use." Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.. 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991).
Alternative theories are available to prove different categories of defective product, including negligence, strict
liability, or implied warranty of merchantability. See, e.g.. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability § 2 cmt. n
(1997). Alternative theories entail different evidentiary burdens. For example, proof of a defect under a negligent
manufacture theory will necessitate proof that the defective condition of the product was the result of negligence in
the manufacturing process, or proof that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the defective condition,
whereas these elements are unnecessary under strict liability or breach of warranty theories. Whatever the theory,
however, the defendant's liability is for the defective product, and not merely for any underlying negligence. See
generally. 63 Am.Jur. 2d Products Liability § 8 (1996) ("In a products liability action, a defect in a product may
consist of a mistake in manufacturing, improper design, or the inadequacy or absence of warnings regarding the
use of the product,")
1J26 Thus, allegations of negligence contained in a claim for products liability do not transform the claim into one
for ordinary negligence. GenTec has overlooked this principle in construing the import of the Special Verdict Form
returned by the jury in this case. The Verdict Form asked: "1. When the product, the silo, left the defendant
GenTec. was it in a defective condition, making the product unreasonably dangerous to the decedent?" and "3.
Was the manufacturer, GenTec, negligent?" Both questions were answered in the affirmative by the jury, and
GenTec now argues that the answer to question three demonstrates that this case was "submitted to the jury on
negligence theories." We conclude, however, that the reference to negligence in question three could only have
been connected to the plaintiffs theory of a product defect based on negligence, as an alternative to its theory of a
product defect based on strict liability, which was addressed by question one. At least one state has expressly
held that the adoption of strict liability doctrine does not abolish the theory of "product liability negligence" as proof
of a product defect. Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co.. 820 F.Supp. 1123, 1127 (S.D. Ind. 1992), and no
argument has been made in this case that the theories are mutually exclusive or inconsistent. See also Monsanto
Co. v. Reed. 950 S.W,2d 811, 814 (Ky. 1997). Therefore, we reject GenTec's argument that this claim sounded in
negligence and was covered by the invoice's indemnification language.
111. JURY VERDICT
1J27 Bishop appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to amend the jury verdict pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60.
Bishop also appeals the trial court's decision to strike the juror affidavits. GenTec properly argues that we should
review a trial court's determination under Utah R. Civ. P. 59 and 60(b) pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard.
We do not address rule 59, however, as rule 59 was not argued by Bishop to the trial court.
1J2S As noted above, Bishop originally filed a motion with the trial court pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a) or (b) to
amend the jury verdict to correct a clerical error; alternatively, the motion asked the court to amend the jury verdict
pursuant to Utah R. Civ, P. 59. In spite of the caption of the motion referring to the alternative theory, Bishop
actually argued at the hearing on the motion only for a correction of the jury verdict under rule 60. Further,
Bishop's counsel orally conceded at the hearing that no tenable basis for relief existed under rule 59. "[l]t is the
substance, not the labeling, of a motion that is dispositive in determining the character of the motion." Bair v.
Axiom Design. L.L.C.. 2001 UT 20, U9, 20 P.3d 388. Thus, even though the motion was captioned as either a rule
60 or a rule 59 motion, we conclude that its substance requires us to treat it as a rule 60 motion to correct a
clerical error.
1J29 Basing its ruling on Rosenlof v. Sullivan. 676 P.2d 372 (Utah 1983), which dealt with a rule 59 motion for a
new trial, the trial court denied Bishop's motion and struck the juror affidavits pursuant to rule 59. The trial court did
not state its grounds for denying Bishop's motion under rule 60, other than explaining that it believed Bishop's
motion was substantively a motion to impeach the jury verdict pursuant to rule 59. We disagree with the trial
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GenTec and Valley Asphalt advocate would not be fairer.
3. In accord with the Restatement, the Utah Legislature promulgated section 78-15-7 on March 15 2000 which
voids any agreement to exempt a seller of a product from strict products liability on grounds of public policy
Section 78- •5-7 is inapplicable to the current case because the accident here occurred before the new section
was adopted. The statute nonetheless reflects the legislature's view of public policy on this question.
4. The court did not decide this issue as it was not properly before the court on appeal.
5. Asplit of authority currently exists over whether a court can admit evidence including iuror affidavits and
testimony, to determine whether the jury verdict reflects the true intent of the jury and to correct the jury verdict
Jurisdictions admitting evidence to correct ajury verdict include: United States v Stauffer 922 F2d 508 513 (9th
Cir 1990) (criminal case); Karl v. Burlington N. R.R. Co.. 880 F.2d~68, 73 (8th Cir. 19897(narrowly interpreting the
clerical error exception to apply to an error in transmission of thejury verdict); Eastridoe Dev Co v Halpert
Assoc, inc., 853 F.2d 772, 783 (10th Cir, 1988); Attridoe v. Cencorp Div. ofDover Techs Int'l, Inc. n^t^ri 113
J,1^ (2d Cir. 1987); Umphrev v. Sprinkel, 682 P,2d 1247, 1254-55 {Idaho 1983); Latino v. Crane Rental Co 630 '
N.E.2d 591. 593 (Mass. 1994); Moisakis v. Allied Bldg. Prods. Corp.. 697 NYS 7d mn 105-06 (N Y App Div
1999) (noting that juror evidence can be used to .correct clerical errors, but not to determine the extent of juror
confusion regarding the verdict as rendered); Newport Fisherman's Supply Co v Derecktor 569 A2d 1051
1052-53 (R.I. 1990); State v. Williquette, 526 N.W.2d 144, 151 (Wis. 1995) (criminal case, but extended by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court to both civil and criminal cases); see also 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2355 (Chadbourne
rev 1978) (discussing the admissibility ofevidence to correct a jury verdict); J. F. Ghent, Annotation Competency
ofJuror s Statement or Affidavit to Show That Verdict in Civil Case Was Not Correctly Recorded 18 AL R3d 1132
§ 3 (1968) (discussing cases that allow clerical error exception).
Jurisdictions not admitting evidence to correct a jury verdict include: Plummer v. Springfield Term Rv 5 F 3d 1 3(1st Cir. 1993); Cyr v. Mitchaud, 454 A.2d 1376 1383-84 (Me. 1983); McKinnev v Smith 322 P 2d 110 111 (NM
1958); see also J. F. Ghent, Annotation, Competency of Juror's Statement or Affidavit to Show That Verdict in Civil
Case Was Not Correctly Recorded, 18 A.L,R.3d 1132, §§ 6-7 (1968) (discussing cases that do not allow clerical
error exception).
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